What Actually Determines Whether an Electricity Utility Chief Executive Succeeds
By Engr. Bello Musa
Nigeria’s eleven distribution companies have appointed more than forty chief executives in thirteen years, drawn from engineering, accountancy, banking, law, economics and management consulting. Aggregate losses have barely moved. The evidence points away from the credentials on the curriculum vitae and towards three conditions boards and shareholders control: competence that has been demonstrated rather than certified, capital actually disbursed, and authority genuinely granted.
The Wrong Question
When the board of a Nigerian distribution company sits down to choose a chief executive, the first document on the table is always the curriculum vitae. Within a few minutes the conversation has settled on qualifications. Does this candidate hold an MBA? From where? And if not, what is there instead?
It is the wrong question, and the evidence that it is the wrong question has been piling up in plain sight for thirteen years.
Since the eleven DISCOs passed into private hands on 1 November 2013, they have appointed more than forty chief executives. The professional range has been extraordinary. Chartered accountants and electrical engineers. Bankers and management consultants. Economists, lawyers, career utility people who began at NEPA, and expatriates who arrived with experience of mature markets elsewhere. Between them they hold business degrees from British, American and Nigerian universities, doctorates in management and economics, and fellowships of the professional institutes.
Over the same period, aggregate technical, commercial and collection losses moved from above 40 per cent in 2016 to 36.23 per cent in the second quarter of 2026, against a tariff-setting target of 16.92 per cent. Thirteen years. Four percentage points. Every profession the Nigerian labour market can supply has now had a turn at the problem, and none of them has solved it.
That record can be read two ways. Either Nigeria has been remarkably unlucky in its executives, or the sector has been asking candidates to prove the wrong thing and then withholding the conditions under which any answer would have mattered. I take the second view, and what follows is my case for it.
The question a board should be asking is not what a candidate studied. It is what that candidate has actually turned round, under what conditions, and whether this board is prepared to supply the same conditions here.
Notice where the weight falls in that sentence. Only the opening clause concerns the candidate. Everything after it concerns the board, and that is the half nobody enjoys discussing.
Three conditions have to hold. The first is competence that has been demonstrated rather than certified: a record of execution against measurable targets in a comparable business, which is a different thing from a qualification attesting to exposure. The second is capital that has actually been disbursed. Not approved, not pledged, not contingent on a refinancing that may never close, but committed and available on a timetable matching the work it is meant to fund.
The third is authority genuinely granted — a defined mandate, a board that holds together, a tenure longer than the payback period of the programme, and freedom from interference in the decisions the chief executive will later be judged on.
Where all three have been present, chief executives of wildly different academic backgrounds have transformed distribution utilities. Where one has been missing, the most impeccably credentialled executive available has failed. Nigeria has demonstrated the second half of that proposition more often than any country should have to.
Qualification Against Competence
Let me be clear at the outset. This is not an argument against the MBA. It is an argument against treating one as a proxy for something it does not measure.
A rigorous business degree builds capabilities a utility chief executive genuinely needs. It teaches you to read a set of accounts and interrogate them rather than accept the finance director’s summary of them. It covers capital structure and the cost of capital, which between them determine whether a loss-reduction programme can be financed at all. It instils appraisal discipline, the habit of testing an investment against its alternatives rather than against one’s own enthusiasm for it.
It develops negotiation, and a DISCO chief executive negotiates constantly: with lenders, meter asset providers, bulk traders, state governments and a regulator. It introduces organisational design and change management, which is most of what a utility turnaround actually consists of. It also supplies a peer network and the confidence to hold a room full of financiers who speak that language.
An executive of any background who lacks all of that, and makes no serious effort to acquire it, will struggle in the role. I have watched it happen more than once.
What the qualification does not supply is the capacity to read a feeder-level energy balance, to judge whether a stated technical loss is physically plausible for that conductor at that loading, to work out whether a proposed metering architecture can be bypassed, or to rank capital projects by asset criticality and loss contribution.
Nor does it supply the thing that matters most, which is a record of having done the job. A degree certifies that somebody was exposed to a body of knowledge and met an assessment standard on a particular day. It says nothing about execution. A candidate who has taken fifteen points off ATC&C losses in a comparable franchise has demonstrated something no classroom can award. A candidate who has not has demonstrated nothing about execution, however distinguished the school.
The Nigerian record bears this out with some force. In the leadership history I examine below, holders of business degrees, management doctorates, economics doctorates and accountancy fellowships have presided over some of the sector’s worst outcomes, including the worst of all. Executives holding no such qualification have run companies through conditions that would have finished most managers. The relationship between business credentials and performance is simply absent, in both directions, and I could not make it appear however I cut the figures.
So where does that leave the qualification? Not mandatory, because the evidence will not support making it so, and because a mandatory requirement would have excluded several of the most effective utility executives in my comparator set. But not decorative either, because the capabilities it develops are real, and a candidate who claims them by another route has to show the work.
The sensible position is that an MBA is one of several acceptable routes to executive competence, and an advantage where it exists.
For a board, the practical consequence is a shift in where the burden sits. A business degree is not evidence of commercial capability; it is a reason to expect commercial capability, which the board then goes and tests. Its absence is not evidence against commercial capability; it is a reason to test for it explicitly rather than assume it is missing. Either way the assessment is of the capability rather than the certificate, and either way the test is identical: what has this person financed, negotiated, budgeted or restructured, and what happened afterwards?
What The Global Roster Actually Shows
The familiar list of celebrated chief executives gets deployed by both sides of this argument, always selectively. Read in full, it supports neither.
Five of the eleven held no higher qualification of any description at all: Henry Ford, who came through a machinist apprenticeship and became chief engineer at Edison Illuminating; Steve Jobs, who left Reed College after one semester; Bill Gates, who left Harvard without completing his degree; Michael Dell, who left the University of Texas at Austin; and Richard Branson, who left school at sixteen.
Three more took engineering doctorates or master’s degrees and hold no business qualification: Jack Welch, PhD in chemical engineering from the University of Illinois; Lee Iacocca, BS in industrial engineering from Lehigh and MS in engineering from Princeton; and Jensen Huang, BSEE from Oregon State and MSEE from Stanford.
Only three hold a formal management qualification, and one of those is not a conventional MBA: Alan Mulally, who holds BS and MS degrees in aeronautical and astronautical engineering from Kansas and a MIT Sloan Fellows master’s in management; Satya Nadella, who holds a BE in electrical engineering from Manipal, an MS in computer science from Wisconsin-Milwaukee, and an MBA from Chicago Booth; and Indra Nooyi, who holds a BSc and PGDM in India and a Master’s in public and private management from Yale.
If credentials determined outcomes, that distribution would not look the way it does.
What the roster does show, with real consistency, is something less convenient to either camp: deep immersion in the domain before the appointment, and an institutional position that permitted decisive action. Welch spent twenty years inside General Electric before running it. Nadella spent twenty-two inside Microsoft. Huang founded NVIDIA and never left. Ford, Jobs and Dell built the businesses they ran. Nooyi had been at PepsiCo for twelve years before she took the top job.
Mulally At Ford
One case deserves longer treatment, because it maps almost exactly onto the argument I am making here.
Alan Mulally arrived at Ford in September 2006 as a career aeronautical engineer from Boeing, with no MBA and no experience whatever of the motor industry. Ford reported a net loss of $5.8 billion in that quarter alone and went on to lose $12.7 billion across the year.
His first significant act was not a strategy. It was financing. Within weeks he mortgaged essentially everything Ford owned, the blue oval trademark included, to raise $23.6 billion, more than the company had set out to borrow. When the financial crisis arrived two years later, Ford was the only one of the Detroit three that did not require federal rescue, and it was back in profit by 2009.
Three features of that story bear directly on Nigerian distribution.
He raised the money before he needed it, and everything else followed from having it. No amount of operational discipline would have carried Ford through 2008 without that facility. Secure the capital, then execute. That is the exact reverse of the Nigerian sequence, in which executives are appointed to deliver loss reductions and then left to find out what funding, if any, will follow.
His technical formation mattered, but not as a credential. What he brought was systems thinking and an outsider’s willingness to interrogate assumptions Detroit had long since stopped examining. He brought no automotive expertise at all. A method transferred; a domain did not.
And he was given authority, then backed in using it. Bill Ford Jr stepped aside from the chief executive role and supported him through brand disposals, plant closures and a debt package that appalled his own management team. A Mulally without that backing is simply an executive whose first major proposal gets vetoed.
Reading The Roster Carefully
Attribution is slippery here. Welch’s General Electric record is inseparable from the expansion of GE Capital, a financial business whose later distress complicates the verdict considerably. Iacocca’s Chrysler rescue depended on $1.5 billion of US federal loan guarantees, a detail usually omitted from accounts crediting his salesmanship, and one that makes him an argument for capital rather than for individual brilliance.
There is a selection problem too. Lists like this are assembled from companies that succeeded. The equally qualified executives whose companies failed never appear on them, which makes any inference from this population to a general rule about qualifications unsound.
And transferability is limited. Not one of these people ran a regulated monopoly distribution utility under a frozen tariff in a market with a collapsed payment chain. The comparison illuminates. It does not prove.
Four Utilities That Did What Nigeria Has Not
I have chosen four comparators, each of which isolates a different one of the conditions I say are decisive.
Delhi
Tata Power Delhi Distribution took over North and North-West Delhi on 1 July 2002 with aggregate technical and commercial losses of 53.1 per cent. That is a worse starting position than nine of Nigeria’s eleven DISCOs occupy today. Delhi was then the power theft capital of India, with over 500 transformer failures a month and six-hour load shedding.
Losses fell to roughly 17 per cent within five years, 10.5 per cent by March 2014 and 5.9 per cent by March 2024. Transformer failure rates went from 11 per cent to 0.55 per cent, and system availability from 70 per cent to above 99.
The World Bank credits this to roughly $620 million of investment, loss-reduction obligations written into the concession document itself, a tariff mechanism under which efficiency gains offset procurement cost increases rather than disappearing into shareholder returns, a 51/49 joint venture that left the Delhi government with a material stake in success, and sustained enforcement against theft in the hardest clusters.
What Delhi isolates is capital tied contractually to loss targets. Nigeria has the targets. It does not have the capital.
Uganda
Umeme took on Uganda’s distribution network in 2005 under a twenty-year concession, inheriting energy losses of 38 per cent, electricity access below ten per cent and 290,000 customers. By the time the concession ended on 31 March 2025 it had brought losses down to 16.0 per cent, invested over US$860 million, grown the customer base to 2.2 million and lifted collections to 99 per cent from 80 per cent in 2005.
On the operational measures that is the most complete distribution turnaround sub-Saharan Africa has produced. The second half of the story is the more instructive one. That capital arrived because the concession guaranteed a 20 per cent return on investment, set high to compensate for the risk of investing in Uganda’s power sector in 2004-05. The return made tariffs expensive, drew years of political criticism, and in the end persuaded the government not to renew. Umeme handed the network back to a state company with the two sides still disputing the buyout figure by more than $100 million.
Uganda shows that private capital at scale can be bought, but that it is priced. The country paid for a genuine turnaround in tariffs for twenty years. Nigeria has so far declined to pay either in tariffs or in equity, and has received neither the investment nor the turnaround.
South Africa
Eskom gives us something close to a controlled comparison, because the same dysfunctional utility was run in quick succession by executives of markedly different profiles.
Under André de Ruyter, from late 2019 to February 2023, load shedding rose from 1,296 GWh in his first year to 16,652 GWh in the year he left. Dan Marokane took office on 1 March 2024: a qualified chemical engineer with a master’s in engineering from the University of London and an MBA from Cape Town who had previously chaired Eskom Enterprises and served as the group’s chief commercial and technology officer. He already knew the plant. Load shedding fell from 280 days in the 2023 financial year to 13 in 2025, and profit rose from R3.8 billion to R25.9 billion.
Two qualifications are owed. Eskom’s chairman credits Marokane with executing a strategy the board had already developed, and de Ruyter maintains that his own tenure built momentum which only surfaced later. The second claim is plausible, since generation recovery has long lead times. The improvement is also inseparable from a government debt-relief package and a reconstituted board.
What worked at Eskom was a combination: technical qualification, prior knowledge of that specific utility, formal business education, and a board that had done its own strategic thinking and then stood behind its executive. Not a degree. A fit between a person, an institution and a mandate.
Great Britain
Britain’s distribution networks were privatised in 1990 under price-cap regulation, which Ofgem replaced in 2013 with the RIIO framework, where revenue is set by incentives, innovation and delivered outputs rather than by permitted costs. The mechanism matters more here than the ownership. Companies that outperform their allowances keep a defined share of the gain; those that underperform carry the loss.
The results are undramatic, which is rather the point. Distribution losses run at around seven to eight per cent of electricity transported. Across RIIO-ED1, customer interruptions fell 19 per cent while network operators spent £34.7 billion against their allowances, with outperformance shared between companies and customers. Cambridge researchers put productivity improvement in the British sector at about 1 per cent a year under incentive regulation, against 0.3 per cent in Japan under rate-of-return regulation.
Britain is also candid about its limits, and the candour is worth noting. Ofgem has acknowledged that network losses cannot be measured accurately, being calculated as the difference between energy entering and leaving the network, and that operators therefore have no inherent incentive to manage them efficiently unless one is designed for them. That is a striking admission from a mature system, and a warning to us: energy accounting is difficult even where metering is universal.
What Britain isolates is regulation that lets an efficient operator keep part of what it saves. Where a Nigerian DISCO that reduces losses watches the benefit vanish into frozen tariffs and market debt, the incentive to invest is simply not there.
The Common Thread
None of these four turnarounds is explained by its chief executive’s academic qualifications, and the executives concerned held very different ones. All four are explained by some combination of capital that actually arrived, targets tied to that capital, tariff or incentive arrangements that rewarded efficiency, and governance stable enough to let a strategy run for several years.
Nigeria has had thirteen years and more than forty chief executives, and none of those four conditions reliably in place at any DISCO.
The Conditions They Actually Worked In
No judgement about a DISCO chief executive means very much without an honest account of the circumstances. Those circumstances have been severe, and in several respects they have worsened since 2013 rather than improved.
The eleven successor companies took over on 1 November 2013 with dilapidated networks, no reliable energy accounting, minimal metering, workforces inherited wholesale from PHCN, and customer bases long accustomed to estimated billing and non-payment. The privatisation was sold on the expectation that private capital and commercial discipline would follow the handover. In several cases the core investors had borrowed to fund the acquisition itself, which meant the companies began life servicing debt rather than investing in the network they had just bought.
Then there is supply. A distribution company cannot sell energy it never receives, and generation available to the grid has fallen rather than risen. NERC recorded 3,885.72 MW in the second quarter of 2026, and grid supply dropped from an average of 4,600 MW in 2025 to below 3,500 MW in the first two months of 2026. The consequence is load shedding to manage limited allocations, which depresses collections, because customers who receive little supply pay less willingly, and erodes the revenue base itself.
Tariffs have been held at July 2024 rates, with the federal government subsidising about ₦321.26 billion of generation costs in the second quarter of 2026 alone, roughly half of total generation cost. A frozen tariff bridged by subsidy severs the link between efficiency and reward.




